David Hume and the Problem of Other Minds

The problem of other minds has widely been considered as a special problem within the debate about scepticism. If one cannot be sure that there is a world existing independent ly of one’s mind, how can we be sure that there are minds – minds which we cannot even experience the way we experience material objects? <br>This book shows, through a detailed examination of David Hume’s <em>A Treatise of Human Nature</em>, that these concerns are unfounded. By focusing on Hume’s discussion of sympathy – the ability to connect with the mental contents of other persons – Anik Waldow demonstrates that belief in other minds can be justified by the same means as belief in material objects. <br>The book thus not only provides the first large-scale treatment of the function of the belief in other minds within the <em>Treatise,</em> thereby adding a new dimension to Hume’s realism, but also serves as an invaluable guide to the complexity of the problem of other minds and its various responses in contemporary debate.